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On January 8, 1982, Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter
and Charles L. Brown, chairman of the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (AT&T or Bell), jointly announced settlement of the
government's 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T and its affiliates.1 The
settlement, as approved by Judge Harold Greene," required AT&T to
divest its local Bell operating companies and satisfied virtually all of the
demands for structural relief made at trial by the Department of Justice
(DOJ or Department). The Department has thus achieved its litigation
objectives without a judicial decision on the merits of its case.
Why did AT&T suddenly agree to the draconian structural reorganiza-
tion it had spent almost a decade and millions of dollars in legal fees
resisting? Our analysis suggests that Bell's legal position was strong, but
that changes in technology and in the regulation of telecommunications
had made advantageous for Bell the divestiture it had previously found so
objectionable. AT&T's profits from long-distance service, required by reg-
ulators for local service subsidies, were being deeply eroded by the entry
of independent long-distance carriers upon whom regulators had imposed
far lower subsidization requirements. Consequently, AT&T let the De-
partment of Justice do what the regulators would never have let the com-
pany do on its own: divest its low-profit local exchange operations, leaving
* This article is a project of the Research Program in Government-Business Relations, Yale School
of Organization and Management. Funding has been generously provided by the General Electric and
Olin Foundations. Comments and criticism have been offered by Professors Louis B. Shwartz and M.
J. Peck, and Olin Fellow Denise McMillan. The authors are grateful for this program and the
valuable assistance, including that of the very creative editors of this journal.
t Dean of the Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester; at the time of drafting
this article, F. W. Beinecke Professor of Economics, Yale University; economic consultant to AT&T
on defense strategies for the antitrust case prior to the settlement.
tf Policy Adviser to the Assistant Secretary, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; former attorney in the Antitrust Division, Depart-
ment of Justice. The views expressed here are not those of the Department of Commerce or any other
government agency.
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
2. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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it free to focus on competing in the long-distance and equipment markets.
AT&T, by capitulating to DOJ and thus "losing" the antitrust suit, won
a reprieve from local service obligations it could not otherwise have
achieved.
Section I of this paper describes the regulatory dilemma facing AT&T,
which required AT&T to subsidize local service yet tolerate encroachment
on its long-distance profits by new competitors. Section II discusses the
allegations at issue in DOJ's suit against AT&T and delineates the terms
of the settlement. In Section III, we analyze the legal merits of the suit
and conclude that had the case proceeded to judgment, AT&T probably
would have avoided liability and, even in the event of liability, divestiture.
Section IV examines the economic effects of the settlement and highlights
what must have been AT&T's primary consideration in acceding to di-
vestiture: Freed from the requirement that it pay a disproportionate share
of the costs of local service, AT&T will be able to compete much more
vigorously in the lucrative long-distance and equipment markets-so vig-
orously, in fact, that it may drive its competitors out of those markets. On
the other hand, the divested local exchange companies will have to raise
substantially local service rates to cover costs, or else AT&T's competitors
will be charged significantly higher fees to pay for local service subsidies.
Section V, the concluding section of the article, assesses the implications of
the settlement for antitrust enforcement and regulatory policy.
I. AT&T's Dilemma: Inconsistent Regulation
A. The Subsidization of Local Services Out of Long-distance Revenues
For the past century, the American telecommunications industry has
been an intensely regulated sector of the economy. Companies in the in-
dustry face regulation in virtually all of their activities, through require-
ments that a myriad of service tariffs' be certified and approved by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and by state regulatory
agencies, and through controls on entry into all fields of service. In estab-
lishing "just and reasonable" 4 prices, the FCC and most state regulatory
agencies have as a central goal the assurance of universal service; the lan-
guage of the Communications Act of 1934,' the basic statutory framework
within which the FCC operates, expresses this objectivet in the following
3. A "tariff" must be filed with the FCC for every service offering. The tariff not only establishes
the rates for the service, but also specifically defines the offering and its limits, as well as the general
obligations of the company for provision of the service. BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, INC., ENGI-
NEERING AND OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEM 70-71 (1977).
4. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1976); 1913 Mo. Laws 621; 1911 N.J. Laws 380; 1915 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 221.
5. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1046 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)).
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terms: "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and ra-
dio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges." 6 The pursuit of this objective has meant that the prices for dif-
ferent services do not bear any consistent relationship to the costs of pro-
viding those services. In this rate structure disoriented by regulation, long-
distance rates far exceed the costs of providing service; the profit opportu-
nities created by this disparity have attracted new entrants into the long-
distance market.
The U.S. telecommuncations industry is composed of three tiers of com-
panies. At the top stands-and will continue to stand-the nation's largest
corporation, AT&T, which has supplied, through some twenty-three fully
or partly owned "operating companies," approximately eighty-five percent
of local phone service and, through its Long Lines department, approxi-
mately ninety percent of all domestic and international long-distance ser-
vice.7 An AT&T subsidiary, Western Electric, is the largest producer of
telephone equipment and supplies the material needs of virtually the en-
tire Bell System, by manufacturing components itself and by serving as a
centralized procurement agency.6 Western Electric and AT&T jointly
own Bell Laboratories, one of the country's foremost basic and applied
research facilities, which provides virtually all of the new technology in
the domestic telecommunications industry.9
The second tier of companies in telecommunications centers around a
cluster of large, somewhat vertically integrated telephone holding compa-
nies-e.g., General Telephone and Electronics (GTE) and United Tele-
communications-which provide service largely to the less populated areas
of the country. In addition, many firms have recently entered the intercity
and equipment fields; the antitrust suit focused on Bell's competition with
these firms. The third tier of the telephone industry consists of 1,500 or so
rural telephone companies, which serve about twenty-five percent of the
6. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
7. Market share statistics vary across a broad range. A recent Congressional staff report estimated
that AT&T's effective share of the intercity services market exceeds 90 percent. STAFF OF HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON TELECOM., CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., TELECOM.
MUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS-
TRY 124 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE STAFF REPORT). The decree uses a lower
estimate:
There can be no doubt that AT&T's market share in the interexchange market is high. Al-
though it is not possible to focus on a precise figure inasmuch as the number of market share
estimates is almost as varied as the number of persons submitting comments, even AT&T
concedes that as late as 1981 its share of interexchange revenue was around 77 percent.
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 171.
8. See HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 159.
9. Testimony of William D. Nordhaus at 73-83, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at
131.
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country's geographical area but less than four percent of total households.
The flow of funds from long-distance services to the three classes of
local phone companies-AT&T's local operating companies, the other
majors, and the rurals-is determined by both federal and state regula-
tion. The FCC approves tariffs for only the interstate portion of long-
distance services, while the state agencies approve tariffs covering local
and intrastate long-distance services. Since the 1950's, the costs of local
service have been increasing, while the costs of long-distance service have
declined, the latter due largely to technological innovation. Repeated re-
quests for increases in local service charges resulted. State regulatory offi-
cials were hesitant to grant such requests, in light of the substantial politi-
cal costs involved: Ratepayers vote. Moreover, local rate increases
disserved the goal of universal service shared by all regulators.
As a result of the federal/state division of regulatory authority and of
the universal service mandate, rates were divorced from costs. Regulators
turned to "value of service" pricing, under which those users who are less
price-sensitive pay more, and those who are more price-sensitive pay
less.10 As a result, commercial rates were kept higher than residential
rates, and urban and rural users were charged similar rates even though
costs of serving them differed. Long-distance rates were set substantially
above costs in order to generate excess revenues with which to subsidize
local service, thereby avoiding inflation-induced local rate increases. In the
1960's and 1970's, this was accomplished by using long-distance revenues
to cover a substantial and increasing portion of the costs ostensibly com-
mon to both local and long-distance operations.
The arcane process that produces these revenue transfers is called the
Jurisdictional Separations Procedure (separations) and has been developed
through agreements among state regulatory agencies and the FCC." Ini-
tially, the costs directly allocable to intrastate and interstate services are
assigned for ratemaking purposes to the state agencies or the FCC. The
joint and common costs of providing these services are then arbitrarily
divided between the interstate and intrastate categories. It is the arbitrary
division of joint and common costs that constitutes, in the words of Judge
Greene, a "subsidy from interexchange revenues to local rates." 2 Average
price levels for each class of service are then set to satisfy a "revenue
requirement" that covers the assigned portion of these joint and common
costs. The revenues generated under the requirement are then paid to lo-
10. For a theoretical discussion of this principle, see Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departures
from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970).
11. See, e.g., Separation Procedures, 26 F.C.C.2d 248 (1970) (Ozark Plan).
12. 552 F. Supp. at 169 n.161.
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cal companies as "divisions of revenues" if the company is a Bell affiliate,
or as "settlements" if the company is an independent firm.
The current separations agreement, the Ozark Plan,18 deserves specific
discussion. In December, 1969, Bell proposed a large reduction in inter-
state rates, which the FCC allowed to go into effect in January, 1970.14
State regulators, besieged with requests for local service rate increases,
sought help from Congress. Legislation was quickly introduced to remove
from the FCC jurisdiction over separations.1" In April, the FCC reacted
with the creation of a "Joint Board," composed of representatives from
the FCC and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers (NARUC), to reassess the separations process." The Ozark Plan was
the whirlwind result. The plan was first seen by staff of the Joint Board
on June 30, filed with the board on August 6, referred to the FCC on
August 13, proposed as a rule on August 26, and adopted on October
27.17
The Ozark Plan caused a substantial increase in the amount of joint
and common costs borne by long-distance services. 8 Commissioner John-
son, dissenting from the FCC's refusal to consider explicitly the public
interest implications of its decision, bluntly explained the result:
One could advance arguments about what is being done here. But
that would require that we be open, candid, straightforward and
honest in stating what it is we are doing. Basically, what we are
doing is subsidizing the costs of local service with Bell's excess profits
from long-distance service. [Emphasis added.]19
The effect of changes in separations plans is shown in Table One.
These plans have imposed progressively larger shares of joint costs on
13. 26 F.C.C.2d at 248.
14. AT&T, Revisions to AT&T Tariff F.C.C. No. 263, Long Distance Message Telecom. Serv.,
20 F.C.C.2d 886 (1969).
15. 26 F.C.C.2d at 261.
16. Separation Procedures, 23 F.C.C.2d 465 (1970) (order convening Joint Board). Congress sub-
sequently enacted legislation officially conferring separation jurisdiction on a joint FCC/NARUC
board. Pub. L. No. 92-131, § 2, 85 Stat. 363 (1971) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 401(c)
(1976)).
17. By contrast, over ten years have elapsed without the FCC determining the procedures by
which AT&T's competitors will be charged their share of joint and common costs. See infra text
accompanying notes 45-48.
18. Under the Ozark formula, subscriber line usage (SLU)-the percentage of time that joint and
common equipment is used by interstate calls-is multipled by 3.3 to arrive at the subscriber plant
factor (SPF)-the percent of joint and common costs to be allocated to interstate jurisdictions. Thus, if
such equipment is used for interstate calling 7 percent of the time, then 23 percent of the joint and
common costs are allocated to interstate jurisdictions. See Testimony of Charles R. Jones at 11-12,
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131.
19. Separation Procedures, 26 F.C.C.2d at 262.
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long-distance operations, causing a substantial increase in the difference
between the price and direct costs for long-distance service. By 1978, one-
third of interstate toll revenues were being directed to the operating com-
panies to cover joint and common costs. This shift of revenues allowed
state regulatory agencies to reject or otherwise moderate requests from
local exchanges for rate increases to compensate for increased costs.
Under the Ozark Plan, as Table Two indicates, price increases in the
1970's for both local and long-distance services were kept well below in-
creases in the Consumer Price Index. Table Three depicts shifts in service
prices and direct operating costs between 1964 and 1977. During this pe-
riod, the average charge for local service in currenv year dollars increased
by two-thirds, while the direct costs associated with that service tripled.
For interstate long-distance service, on the other hand, prices remained
constant in current dollar terms, while direct costs fell by more than two-
thirds. The difference between prices and direct costs for long-distance
service, as a percentage of price, jumped from eight percent in 1964 to
seventy-four percent in 1977; this vastly increased margin was available to
help cover rising local service costs.
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TABLE ONE




Covered Total as a Percentage
Separations by Interstate Interstate of Interstate
Year Plan Revenues Revenues* Revenues
(A) (B) (A/B)
(S millions) (S millions) (%)
1955 Charleston 55 985 5.6
1960 Charleston 90 1520 5.9
1965 Charleston/Denver 205 2435 8.4
1970 FCC Plan 740 3750 19.7
1972 Ozark 1100 4490 24.5
1973 Ozark 1280 5210 24.6
1974 Ozark 1510 5610 26.9
1975 Ozark 1790 6210 28.8
1976 Ozark 1990 7150 27.8
1977 Ozark 2380 7870 30.2
1978 Ozark 2870 8880 32.3
*Revenues
only.
from message toll service (MTS) and wide area telephone service (WATS)
SOURCE: Based on Industry Message Interstate Costs, Testimony of Charles R. Jones,
Attachment 9, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
TABLE TWO
PRICE INDEXES FOR BELL SYSTEM SERVICE CATEGORIES
Interstate Intrastate Local Consumer Price
Year Toll Toll Service Index
(1967=100)
1965 102.9 102.6 100.4 94.5
1970 97.7 105.6 106.5 116.3
1975 106.9 136.4 141.1 161.2
1978 110.1 150.4 155.1 194.0
SOURCE: Based on AT&T ANNUAL REPORTS, various years; Telecommunications,
Competition & Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 898 Before the Sub-
comm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1981) (Statement of NARUC);
CPI from BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRODUCER
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These dramatic changes in the price-cost margins for long-distance and
local services would not have occurred in the absence of regulation. An
unregulated firm would have reduced long-distance prices as direct costs
dropped, thereby stimulating demand and expanding profits. Most experts
agree that demand is more elastic for long-distance calls than for local
service and thus more susceptible to such stimulation."0 An unregulated
telephone company would also have at least doubled local exchange prices
to compensate for increases in direct operating costs."1 Instead, acting
under regulatory constraints and contrary to its profit-maximizing inter-
ests, the Bell System kept its interstate rates more or less constant and
failed to increase local exchange rates sufficiently.
Forcing long-distance services to bear a larger proportion of joint and
common costs furthered the FCC's goal of universal service and appealed
to state regulators as well, because by keeping local service charges low
relative to costs, they were able to reduce both consumer pressure and the
number of rate proceedings. However, the resulting rate structure made
entry into the long-distance market attractive. When that entry occurred,
it upset the entire subsidization process.
B. FCC Policies Fostering Limited Entry
Probably no service industry has experienced, in the recent past, as
many simultaneous changes in competitive conditions as has the telecom-
munications industry. New entry by competitors was encouraged by a
combination of technological advances, which reduced costs, and FCC and
state regulatory policies, which kept up long-distance prices. The FCC
began in the 1950's and 1960's to open up telecommunications to competi-
tive entry-in equipment sales, long-distance services, and even, to some
degree, local services."' However, wary of the impact that "creamskim-
20. See, e.g., Davis, Caccappolo & Chaudry, An Econometric Planning Model for American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. S.. 29 (1973); Dobel, Taylor,
Waverman, Liu & Copeland, Telephone Telecommunications in Canada: Demand, Production and
Investment Decision, 3 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI 175 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Littlechild & Rousseau, Pricing Policy of a U.S. Telephone Company, 4 J. PUB.
ECON. 35 (1975).
22. For the history of entry in the long-distance and equipment fields, see Note, Resale and Shar-
ing of Private Line Communications Services: AT&T Restrictions and FCC Regulations, 51 VA. L.
REV. 679 (1975); Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86
YALE L.J. 538 (1977); Comment, Intercity Telecommunications Competition After Execunet, 31 FED.
COM. L.J. 117 (1978). Mobile radio services have become competitive with some of the services tradi-
tionally provided by local carriers. Judicial and FCC rulings have fostered this development. Alloca-
tion of Frequencies in the 150.8-162 Mc/s Band (Guardband), 12 F.C.C.2d 841, 14 F.C.C.2d 269
(1968), aJfd sub nom. Radio Relay Corp. v. FCC, 409 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1969); Mobile Radio
Communications, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 62 (1971) ("head-start" policy); Land Mobile Serv. (Cellular
Mobile Radio), 51 F.C.C.2d 945 (1974). Revenue growth in this field has also been spectacular: In
1976, land mobile radio equipment and services generated about $731 million in revenues; in 1980,
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ming" by new entrants might have on the separations process and on the
pursuit of its regulatory goals, the Commission limited entry to private
line services not using the Bell switched exchange network .2  This restric-
tion on entry was upended in 1977, when a Court of Appeals reversed the
FCC in the critical Execunet decisions,"" thereby opening the floodgates to
new competitors and leaving both the FCC and AT&T in a state of
confusion.
The first court decision upholding the right of telephone customers to
use equipment supplied by firms other than Bell was the 1956 Hush-a-
Phone decision."5 Previous FCC policy had flatly prevented customer use
of any non-AT&T equipment if connected to the AT&T switched tele-
phone network. The Hush-a-Phone device was not directly connected to
the network, but was a simple attachment that snapped onto a telephone
receiver and provided for privacy of conversation. Judge Bazelon reversed
the FCC's refusal to sanction this new device, writing that, "The inter-
venors' [AT&T's] tariffs under the Commission's decision are in [sic] un-
warranted interference with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably to
use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being
publicly detrimental. '"' Following this decision, the FCC, in its
Carterfone ruling, relaxed its regulations on the use of non-Bell telephone
equipment.'
7
As a practical matter, however, the conditions necessary for sustained
competition in the customer-premises telephone equipment market were
not fully established until the FCC's "Registration Program" was imple-
mented in 1977."8 Until then, Bell had required the use of a protective
revenues exceeded $2.4 billion, and it is predicted that they will rise to $4.7 billion by 1985. Miles,
An Overview of the Land Mobile Industry, COMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1980, at 57.
23. The switched exchange network refers to the portion of the Bell network that connects local
users to other local users or to long-distance trunk lines. Most calls are switched, but some are not
(e.g., when calls are made within a business complex using an internal switching system). If denied
access to the Bell switched exchange network, a competitive carrier would be forced to find alternative
switching facilities or construct its own.
24.. MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC (Execunet 1), 561 F.2d 365 (D.C.Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1040 (1978); MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC (Execunet 1I), 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
25. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Use of
Recording Devices, 11 F.C.C. 1033 (1947).
26. 238 F.2d at 269.
27. Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). See also AT&T Foreign At-
tachment Tariff Revisions, 15 F.C.C.2d 605 (1968), 18 F.C.C.2d 871 (1969). The Carterfone ruling
initially applied only to equipment already in place; it did not afford customers a right to replace
equipment already supplied by the local phone company. The FCC broadened the scope of Carterfone
in 1975 to include such displacement actions. See AT&T Proposed Tariff Revisions (Mebane Home
Tel. Co.), 53 F.C.C.2d 473, 476 (1975).
28. Interstate Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (Registration Program), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975),
58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976); see North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
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connection attachment (PCA) with any non-Bell equipment being hooked
into the system. Under the registration program, virtually any equipment
satisfying minimal performance standards could be "registered" with the
FCC, "type-accepted," and then used by telephone subscribers without a
PCA-but only for non-network functions. Sales of customer-premises
phone equipment supplied by firms other than AT&T and other carriers
have since expanded rapidly." Carrier-affiliated companies-in particular
Western Electric-continue to receive most of the revenues in the equip-
ment field." However, new entry has reduced AT&T's profit margins on
equipment, particularly commercial equipment."
Competitive entry in the long-distance telecommunications field has also
had a long and erratic history. The Communications Act of 1934
provided:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate
or foreign communication by wire or radio . . . in accordance with
the orders of the Commission, in cases where the Commission, after
opportunity for hearing, finds such actions necessary or desirable in
the public interest, to establish physical connections with other carri-
ers .. .a2
Thus, the FCC did not have to grant all requests for interconnection, but
only those it deemed to be in the public interest. For many years, long-
distance service was left in the hands of regulated monopolies.
Technological advances, however, changed the competitive landscape.
In particular, microwave relay facilities-based on technology developed
by Bell Labs during World War II-offered long-distance service at costs
substantially below those of existing wire facilities. In its 1959 Above
890" decision, the FCC authorized certain private companies to provide
29. NORTH AMERICAN TEL. ASS'N, INDUSTRY STATISTICAL REVIEW 1980; U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1982 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 228. Different sources have developed slightly different sales
figures; all agree that between 1977 and the present, "interconnect" sales have at least doubled. The
North American Telephone Association, the "interconnect" industry's principal trade association, esti-
mated 1974 total sales of $320 million, 1979 sales of 8729 million, and 1981 sales of over 81.4 billion.
30. HOUSE STAFF REPORT supra note 7, at 184; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at
228; NORTH AMERICAN TEL. ASS'N, supra note 29. In 1981, for example, total equipment industry
revenues amounted to about $12.2 billion, of which Western Electric received approximately 75 per-
cent. In the critical submarket for network switching equipment used in providing most toll and local
services, Western Electric continued to be almost the sole source of supply.
31. HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 184; Hearings on H.R. 5158 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecom., Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 106 (1982) (Testimony of Charles Marshall, Executive Vice President,
AT&T).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
33. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959); modified 29
F.C.C. 825 (1960).
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microwave services for their own internal use. That decision, though lim-
ited in scope, indirectly created pressure for entry into other fields.
In 1963, MCI applied to the FCC to supply private line communica-
tions between St. Louis and Chicago. MCI's application was for non-
switched service; that is, it did not request any connection with the Bell
switched network. The application generated substantial controversy. A
1967 Presidential Task Force on Communications Policy, headed by Eu-
gene V. Rostow, recommended that, to retain efficiencies of scale and to
prevent creamskimming, the public network should remain a regulated
monopoly, with entry limited to private non-switched services."' In fact,
the FCC granted MCI's application in 1969 on just such a limited basis.88
In 1971, the FCC adopted rules sanctioning a policy of entry into the
narrowly defined private line field."6 Its Specialized Common Carrier de-
cision stated:
[Clompetition in the specialized communications field is reasonably
feasible, there are grounds for a reasonable expectation that new en-
try will have some beneficial effects, and there is no reason to antici-
pate that new entry would have any adverse impact on service to the
public by existing carriers such as to outweigh the considerations
supporting new entry.
87
This statement, the FCC later said,88 was intended to be limited to entry
into service markets not on the Bell system, i.e., non-switched communica-
tions between customer facilities. No specific mention of interconnection
was made, in part because none of the entering carriers requested it. The
decision was so confusing on this and other issues that one judge has re-
ferred to it as "not a model of clarity," 9 while another has called it an
"abomination" and "one of the worst examples of legal draftsmanship I
have ever seen. "40
The incentives for further encroachment by independent "Specialized
Common Carriers" (SCC's) were very strong. FCC policies did not re-
quire SCC's to contribute to separations payments; therefore, the access
charges for attachment to the local exchanges were lower for these firms
34. Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 862 (D.D.C. 1983).
35. Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1967), reconsid. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d
190 (1970), modifs. granted, 27 F.C.C.2d 380 (1971).
36. Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), afl'd sub noma. Washington
Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
37. 29 F.C.C.2d at 920.
38. MCI Telecom. Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1977).
39. Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. at 865.
40. MCI Communications Corp v. AT&T, 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 112, 114
n.13 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 1983) (quoting Grady, J., Trial Tr. 3785).
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than for Bell's own Long Lines department.41 This disparity opened up to
the SCC's greater profit margins in toll services than those enjoyed by
Bell Long Lines, which continued to subsidize local services. Following
MCI's lead, affiliates of Southern Pacific Railroad, ITT, and others of the
largest companies in the country entered the field.
When MCI proposed new switched service in direct competition with
Bell's Long Lines, the FCC refused approval. 42 In its decision, the Com-
mission explained that Specialized Common Carriers was meant to allow
entry only into private line service, and not into direct competition with
the public network. As noted above, the Court of Appeals, in Execunet,"'
reversed the FCC and opened virtually all intercity markets to competi-
tors. After Execunet, the FCC attempted to adapt to the new judicially
imposed reality by further lowering entry barriers. For example, in 1980
it eliminated rules that had prohibited the sharing of heavy use, bulk rate
circuits, and it directed AT&T to permit the resale and sharing of these
circuits by its competitors.44
However, the Commission has been slow to modify separations proce-
dures to reflect competitive entry. SCC's are now charged a portion of
joint and common costs,4 but charges are still not on a par with Bell
separations contributions." The FCC has been developing for years a
"Cost Allocation Manual," meant to establish an economically justified
method of determining separations payments.4' As part of this process, the
FCC in 1976 directed AT&T to price all interstate services on a fully
distributed cost basis;48 these higher floors for Bell's prices were above the
marginal costs, and perhaps even the average total costs, of new entrants,
since they included an arbitrary percentage share of AT&T's fixed costs.
Yet the cost allocation process is still incomplete. 9 In the meantime,
Bell Long Lines continues to pay twenty-two percent of joint and common
costs, even though long-distance calls take up only seven percent of the
time used on common facilities.' The SCC's, on the other hand, continue
41. Exchange Network Facils. for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 71 F.C.C.2d 440, 440-41 (1979).
42. 60 F.C.C.2d at 25.
43. Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 365; Execunet II, 580 F.2d at 590.
44. Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. & Facils., 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), afl'd
sub nom. AT&T Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978); Resale &
Shared Use of Common Carrier Pub. Switched Network Servs., 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1981).
45. ENFIA, 71 F.C.C.2d at 440.
46. Exchange Network Facils. for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 51 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 677,
677 (1982).
47. AT&T, Manual & Procedures for the Allocation of Costs, 84 F.C.C.2d 384, 412-31 (1981).
48. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
920 (1981); MCI Telecom., Inc. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1980); AT&T, Revisions of Tariff
FCC No. 260 Private Line Servs., 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976).
49. 84 F.C.C.2d at 384-85.
50. Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions & Proof 250, United States v. AT&T Co., 552
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to pay access charges at reduced rates that do not cover their portion of
joint and common costs. In these circusmtances, it should not be surprising
that AT&T's share of the long-distance services market continues to fall
by about two percent a year, 5 -or that new entrants, subsidized by cur-
rent separations procedures, continue to flourish. 52
II. The Litigation: Allegations and Settlement
A. Allegations
The Department of Justice filed its antitrust case against AT&T on
November 20, 1974, following an intensive three-year investigation of Bell
System activities. The suit was brought under Section Two of the Sher-
man Act" and relied initially on a novel "triple-bottleneck" theory." The
Department alleged, in essence, that AT&T had illegally manipulated its
dominant position in three sets of telecommunications mar-
kets-equipment, local exchange, and long-distance-in order to monopo-
lize the entire domestic telecommunications industry. The Department ac-
cused AT&T of illegally refusing to provide competitors with local
interconnection service and of setting entry-inhibiting prices in potentially
competitive parts of its business.
Pretrial discovery and stipulations produced some eighty-two discrete
"episodes" of allegedly monopolizing behavior."' By the close of the gov-
ernment's case, sixty-odd of these episodes were still at issue." These can
be divided into two categories: those related to long-distance markets and
those related to equipment markets.
In the first category, a number of episodes involved allegations of re-
fusal to provide interconnection of long-distance competitors. For example,
DOJ cited a Bell "customer premises" requirement that allowed the
hook-up of a long-distance competitor only if hook-up occurred within the
F. Supp. at 131.
51. Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. at 884.
52. See Competitors Chip Away at Market, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1982, at F8; MCI Earnings,
Competition Continue Rise, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1982, at DI. The leading competitor in the intercity
business, MCI increased its revenues from about $37 million in 1977 to more than $560 million in
1982. In 1978, total SCC revenues were about $120 million, the revenues of the domestic satellite
carriers about $70 million, and those of the resale carriers about $30 million. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, supra note 29, at 373. The estimated 1981 revenues of these firms were, respectively, approxi-
mately $700 million, $130 million and $135 million. Id. at 371-72. See also HOUSE STAFF REPORT,
supra note 7, at 120.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973).
54. See Hearings on H.R. 13015 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 748 (1978) (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust John H. Shenefield).
55. For a complete description of the 82 episodes, see Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions
and Proof, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F Supp: at 131.
56. United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1343 (D.D.C. 1981).
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confines of the customer's premises, thereby preventing the use by compet-
itors of local networks in the operation of their competing systems. Simi-
larly, the government endeavored to show that AT&T had calculatedly
refused to provide General Electric-itself a major company presumably
capable of safeguarding its commercial interests-with services necessary
to enable it to construct and operate its own private communications net-
work."' In addition, allegations were made that intercity competitors, in
obtaining interconnection from local operating companies, experienced de-
lays, poor maintenance, inferior and erratic service, discrimination be-
tween competitors, and bad faith negotiations by AT&T."8
The Justice Department also alleged antitrust violations by AT&T in
its use of the regulatory process. For instance, one episode involved Bell's
opposition in FCC hearings to the offering of metered long-distance ser-
vice by MCI.59
The Department contended further that AT&T had engaged in preda-
try pricing in the long-distance market. DOJ argued not that Bell priced
its services below cost, but rather that its prices had been set without re-
gard to cost. One such allegation was that Bell's Hi/Low private line
rates-initially allowed by the FCC in 1974 -were deliberately set at
noncompensatory levels as an anticompetitive response to independent pri-
vate line services.6 ' AT&T had argued that markets generating high
volumes of traffic were in fact experiencing lower per-unit costs of service,
which justified lower prices than those charged in lower density markets.
The Hi/Low tariff schedule allowed lower long-distance rates in these
high-density areas. But these were also the markets in which SCC's
sought authorization to provide new service precisely because of lower
per-unit costs. The FCC ultimately reversed itself, concluding that AT&T
had not submitted enough information to justify the Hi/Low rates-but
not finding, as DOJ later contended, that they were predatory.'
2
The filing of similar tariffs to supplant Hi/Lo rates was alleged by
DOJ to reflect exclusionary and predatory behavior."' These tariffs, again
57. 524 F. Supp. at 1354. The Department further alleged that defendants' refusal to provide FX
(foreign exchange) and CCSA (common control switching arrangement) services to competitors until
so ordered by the FCC was proof of monopolization. Id. at 1335. FX services allows a customer to
make and receive calls from a distant location as if they were local calls. CCSA allows a customer to
create its own long-distance network for intra-oflce communications.
58. Id. at 1355-57.
59. Id. at 1356, 1363.
60. AT&T, Voice Grade/Private Line Serv. (High Density-Low Density), 45 F.C.C.2d 88
(1974).
61. 524 F. Supp. at 1365 n.l18.
62. AT&T, Voice Grade/Private Line Serv. (High Density-Low Density), 55 F.C.C.2d 224, 244
(1975) (Interim Decision), 58 F.C.C.2d 362, 370 (1976).
63. 524 F. Supp. at 1365 n.118.
Yale Journal on Regulation
proposing lower rates on high-density routes, were called Multischedule-
Private-Line (MPL) rates and were in turn suspended as a result of FCC
proceedings in 1976." The Justice Department later argued that these
successively rejected tariff filings (Hi/Lo and MPL) were part of a pat-
tern of low rates designed to intimidate potential entrants.
The Justice Department also alleged that predatory pricing directed
against one new entrant, Datran, reflected a policy on the part of AT&T
to exclude others illegally." When AT&T introduced its "Dataphone
Digital Service" (DDS) in March, 1974-only one month before Datran
initiated its own digital service-it filed a tariff proposing rates substan-
tially below those planned by Datran. In fact, two administrative law
judges in 1976 ruled that Bell had understated its costs and overstated
demand, and concluded that the DDS rates were "anticompetitive" and
"predatory." '66 This finding of anticompetitive behavior was affirmed by
the full Commission in 1977,67 but a judicial review of the matter was
declined on jurisdictional grounds. 6 New rates based on fully-distributed
cost methods were proposed and later approved." However, the question
of whether the rates were "predatory" in an antitrust sense is not one that
can be resolved by the FCC proceedings.
As to equipment markets, a series of DOJ allegations involved AT&T's
responses to the attachment of competitors' customer-premises equipment
to the Bell switched network. When non-Western Electric equipment pro-
ducers sought to market telephone hardware, AT&T required that the
purchaser obtain a shielding device (PCA) before attaching the hardware
to the switched network. The Justice Department alleged that this PCA
requirement was deliberately anticompetitive."°
Further allegations involved the monopolization of Bell's own demand
for telephone and switching equipment. DOJ contended, in some seven-
teen additional episodes, that AT&T created a buy-Western bias in its
local operating companies, that AT&T refused to purchase competitors'
goods even if equivalent Bell equipment did not exist, and that crash de-
velopment programs were undertaken when Western Electric did not pro-
duce competing equipment.7 Finally, the Department alleged that in the
equipment market, too, AT&T was engaging in predatory pricing-again
64. AT&T, Private Line Services (MPL), 59 F.C.C.2d 428 (1976).
65. 425 F. Supp. at 1356, 1364.
66. AT&T, Dataphone Digital Serv., 62 F.C.C.2d 815, 841-43 (1976).
67. AT&T, Dataphone Digital Serv., 62 F.C.C.2d 774 (1976).
68. AT&T Co. v. FCC, 602 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
69. Id. at 404.
70. 524 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
71. Id. at 1370-72.
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by pricing its equipment without regard to cost."'
B. The Settlement and Decree
On August 11, 1982, Judge Harold Greene issued an opinion essen-
tially approving the Baxter-Brown settlement and, on August 24, 1982,
entered a modified final judgment. 8 Under its terms, AT&T will divest
itself within eighteen months of its local telephone exchange operations.
The new AT&T will provide long-distance telephone services in markets
that eventually will be deregulated, and it will be allowed for the first
time to diversify into data processing activities.
Current plans under this decree call for the former Bell local operating
companies to be separated into seven regional telephone companies, each
with projected assets of $17 billion to $21 billion. The regional companies
are precluded from entering long-distance communications, or any other
competitive market, with two exceptions: publishing the Yellow Pages and
marketing, though not manufacturing, telephone equipment. 4 AT&T
will retain ownership of its Long Lines department and will obtain the
long-distance telephone facilities of the divested local exchange companies
to form an integrated national long-distance network. AT&T also will
retain Western Electric and Bell Laboratories and will be allowed to com-
pete for the equipment business of the new regional operating companies.
The currently installed base of Bell-owned customer premises equipment
will be transferred from the operating companies to AT&T.
Many of the specifics of the divestiture remain to be fleshed out. AT&T
and the Justice Department have filed with the trial court an elaborate
plan calling for subdivision of local Bell System operations into some 161
"local exchange and transport areas" (LATA's). 5 Some LATA's seem
hardly local at all. California, for example, will apparently be divided into
only four LATA's. Nearly the entire eastern coast of Florida is to be
contained in another, as will the entire lower portion of Michigan. As
much as $5 billion of AT&T's existing intrastate toll traffic may ulti-
72. Id. at 1380.
73. Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1976) (Tunney
Act), the Court is required to make an affirmative "public interest" determination prior to entering
any negotiated antitrust settlement. Judge Greene so determined in the decree. United States v.
AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 143-47. Ironically, it would have been in the public interest to complete
the case and obtain relief through normal judicial decisionmaking rather than entering into the negoti-
ated settlement.
74. 552 F. Supp. at 193-94. The local companies were not permitted under the settlement to
market equipment or to publish Yellow Pages, but this was modified by Judge Greene. Id. at 143,
225.
75. Application for Approval of Exchange Areas or Local Access & Transport Areas (LATA's)
Established Pursuant to the Modification of Final Judgment (Filed Oct. 4, 1982), United States v.
AT&T Co., No. 82-0192 (filed Nov. 20, 1974).
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mately be deemed "local" through this redistricting process.
At the same time, the settlement will lift the constraints imposed by the
1956 Western Electric7' consent decree on AT&T's retailing of data
processing services. The development of markets for integrated transmis-
sion and processing of data has attracted data processing and computer
companies that approach the size of AT&T, and the 1956 decree unjusti-
fiably forestalled the entry of AT&T as an effective competitor. Under the
1982 settlement, AT&T is now free to enter and compete in these emerg-
ing markets, with the exception of a seven-year ban imposed by Judge
Green on entry into electronic publishing.""
These structural changes in AT&T are illustrated in Figure One and
Tables Four and Five. Figure One outlines the present structure of
AT&T. The current Bell operating companies will be divested, in order
to set up seven separate companies with the operating statistics as shown
in Table Four. The remainder makes up the new AT&T Company as
shown in Table Five. At first impression, it seems that the eight emerging
companies will be roughly equal in size, particularly in current sales. But
prospects for earnings, growth, and service are not at all equal.
76. United States v. Western Elee. Co., 1956 Trade Cas (CCH) 1 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
77. 552 F. Supp. at 185-86, 225.
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TABLE FOUR
REGIONAL HOLDING COMPANIES RESULTING
SETTLEMENT
FROM THE








Great Plains 16,109.1 104,900
Far West 16,573.4 114,700
SOURCE: 2 COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, no. 243, at 2 (Dec. 17, 1982).
TABLE FIVE
REVENUES FOR SERVICES TO BE ASSIGNED
TO THE AT&T COMPANY AFTER DIVESTITURE
Operating Total Long-Term Number of
Revenuesa Assetsb Debtb Employeesc
($ billions) ($ billions) (S billions)
Reorganized AT&T* 31.2 24.6 7.8 264,000
* Includes Western Electric, Bell Laboratories, the Long Lines Depart-
ment, other subsidiaries besides basic operating companies, all interstate
toll revenues, roughly half of intrastate toll revenues, and all customer
premises equipment.
SOURCES:
aFigure includes total 1981 Bell System interstate and international
toll revenues ($25.7 billion) and an AT&T-estimated $5.5 billion in in-
trastate toll revenues, as reported in the Baltimore Sun, Oct. 5, 1982, at
B-10, col. 5.
bLehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Research, Divestiture Topics No. 2:
The AT&T Divestiture Plan, 14 (Dec. 17, 1982).
cEstimate from AT&T, 1981 STATISTICAL REPORT.
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Under the settlement, AT&T retains virtually all the higher-profit, ex-
panding portions of the telecommunications business (those shown as
long-distance services in Table Three) and, moreover, is now allowed to
diversify into rapidly expanding markets for data processing and related
services. From Tables Four and Five, it is apparent that AT&T, while
retaining assets of only $25 billion-one-sixth of current Bell System as-
sets-will receive receive annual revenues of over $30 billion or over one-
half of current revenues.7 8 The newly independent exchange companies,
however, will be limited to providing local telephone services-which are
in the lower-profit, lower-growth portion of the current industry.79 Per-
mitting the local firms to market the Yellow Pages and customer-premises
telephone equipment offers them somewhat greater promise of profits and
growth than monthly local telephone service.8" The local operating com-
panies, however, are barred from engaging in any part of the long-dis-
tance communications business. Thus, the practical effect of the decree is
to restrict the new local Bell companies to markets in which past profits
and growth rates were so low that the old AT&T found it necessary to
subsidize them.81
From the perspective of the Justice Department, then, the settlement
ostensibly removes the local exchange "bottleneck" that provided AT&T
monopoly control over the long-distance and equipment markets. From
the perspective of AT&T, the settlement removes the local exchange
losers, leaving it free to compete in the long-distance winners and, as well,
to compete for the first time in data processing. Who is winning and who
is losing?
III. The Merits of the Case
If the AT&T suit had proceeded to judgment, what would have been
the outcome? It is not clear from Judge Greene's opinions whether he
would have found AT&T guilty. In denying AT&T's motion to dismiss,
submitted after the government's presentation of its case in chief but
before AT&T's presentation of its own evidence, Greene stated that the
applicable standard of proof for denial of such motion was very low, and
that the choice was largely discretionary.
[I]t [the Court] is empowered . . . to grant the motion if it is con-
vinced that, on the merits, the [plaintiff's] evidence preponderates
78. For current revenues, see AT&T, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT. The actual division of assets and
revenues between Bell Long Lines and the new operating companies is not yet fully determined.
79. See supra Table Three.
80. 552 F. Supp. at 191-93.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
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against the plaintiff ...
Yet a court is not required to grant a defendant's motion at this
stage of the proceedings even if under the law that motion might
have been granted."
Judge Greene further explained the denial by pointing to the already
lengthy proceedings, and noting that appellate reversal would require a
new trial.8" In the settlement decree, Greene explicitly avoided any "de-
finitive conclusions with regard to either the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a finding of liability or to the validity of AT&T's various legal
and factual defenses."1
8 4
To support a finding that AT&T was guilty of monopolization under
Section Two of the Sherman Act, the government had to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, two elements: (1) that AT&T possessed
monopoly power in the U.S. telecommunications markets, and (2) that
AT&T willfully acquired or maintained that power other than through a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.8 5 The govern-
ment's burden of proof is becoming heavier under contemporary antitrust
law, as Berkey-Kodak attests.8" And, as the Second Circuit has more re-
cently noted:
While it is a fundamental tenet of antitrust law that customers will
benefit from the salubrious effects of competition, a monopolist's
right to compete is not limited to actions undertaken with an altruis-
tic purpose. Even monopolists must be allowed to do as well as they
can with their business.8 7
The fact that AT&T is regulated, both by the FCC and state regula-
tory bodies, affects the Sherman Act analysis in several ways. First, regu-
lation sometimes creates an implied, complete immunity from the antitrust
laws.8 Early in the proceedings, AT&T attempted to invoke this immu-
nity, but was rebuffed by Judge Greene. 9 AT&T could have appealed
82. United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1343.
83. Id.
84. 552 F. Supp. at 161.
85. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
86. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See Comment, Antitrust Scrutiny of Monopolists' Innovations: Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 93 HARV. L. REV. 408 (1979); Note, Standards for an Integrated Mo-
nopolist's Liability Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620 (1980).
87. Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 93 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 695 (1975); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-78 (1973).
89. United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
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this ruling after a final judgment.9" Second, because AT&T was regulated
by the FCC, Judge Greene had the option, under the "primary jurisdic-
tion" doctrine, of referring to the FCC those issues that involved a conflict
between antitrust principles and regulatory goals." Arguably, the entire
case presented this conflict. Judge Greene, and Judge Waddy before him,
expressed an intention to refer appropriate issues to the Commission, but
no such referral was ever made. 2 Lastly, as discussed below, the regula-
tion of AT&T by the FCC is relevant in determining whether the govern-
ment proved each of the two elements of Section Two of the Sherman Act:
monopoly power and purposeful acts.
A. Monopoly Power
According to the Supreme Court, "[m]onopoly power is the powqr to
control prices and to exclude competitors."'98 Since these indicia are diffi-
cult to establish directly, courts often look to market share as the principal
sign of monopoly power. In Alcoa, Judge Hand noted that, even though
ninety percent of a relevant market is enough to constitute a monopoly, "it
is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough.""
At the time of trial, AT&T's share in virtually all of its important
markets except local exchange had been falling for some time. It was thus
difficult to establish that Bell even had a monopoly to maintain. Its per-
centages in equipment markets do not satisfy the standards set forth in
Alcoa. Despite Bell's allegedly exclusionary activities, competitive entry
into the long-distance market in the 1970's was persistent and sustained;
such entry continued and even accelerated during the trial period.' 5 In
fact, as Judge Greene noted in the decree,
[b]oth the Department of Justice and AT&T contend that competi-
tion in the interexchange market is growing and that this increase in
competition demonstrates an absence of monopoly power."
Moreover, the FCC had recently taken administrative steps to reduce
90. See Note, AT&T and the Antitrust Laws: A Strict Test for Implied Immunity, 85 YALE L.J.
254 (1975).
91. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States v. AT&T Co.,
461 F. Supp. at 1329.
92. 461 F. Supp. at 1329 n.45. Judge Waddy retired due to illness and was replaced by Judge
Greene.
93. United States v. E.I. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
94. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424.
95. See supra text Section I.B.
96. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 171. Interestingly, DOJ took a contrary position
at trial.
Yale Journal on Regulation
some of the impediments it had placed in the way of fuller entry. For
example, the Commission adopted an equipment registration program9
that afforded users the option of using competitive equipment on the Bell
local exchange system without having to purchase a Bell protective device.
Complaints by SCC's regarding access to local exchange facilities were
also largely resolved by judicial and FCC rulings directing AT&T to
grant competitors more rapid and unimpeded access." Against this back-
ground of eased competitive entry, the Justice Department's focus on alle-
gations of long past abuses, while orderly and methodical, seems abstract
and irrelevant.
But AT&T's strongest argument against the government's contention
that it had the monopoly power to control price and exclude competitors
was the fact that it was comprehensively regulated by the FCC and state
regulatory bodies. AT&T merely proposed tariffs to the regulators; the
regulators, not AT&T, had final authority to determine what prices
would be. Moreover, the FCC had authority to approve or deny new en-
try into almost all markets, authority that was designed primarily to pre-
vent market power." Hence, AT&T could not possibly have had monop-
oly power in any regulated market.1"' This argument was recently
adopted in the Southern Pacific case. 101
B. Purposeful Acts
Monopoly power alone is not sufficient to establish a violation of Sec-
tion Two of the Sherman Act; some act or conduct, the purpose of which
is to obtain or maintain a monopoly position, must be found. Examples of
such purposeful, anticompetitive conduct are (1) exclusionary conduct that
unnecessarily impairs or restricts the ability of other firms to compete,10 2
(2) predatory pricing, and (3) refusal of a company possessing a natural
monopoly to supply an essential product or facility on a reasonable, non-
97. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
98. Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 365; Execunet II, 580 F.2d at 590.
99. Policies & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. & Facils., 84
F.C.C.2d 445, 457, 459 (1981).
100. Mid-Texas Communications, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1386-87 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 361 F. Supp. 774, 780
(W.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); Redwing Carriers,
Inc. v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 443 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Fla. 1977), alTd, 594 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.
1979); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1209-10 & n.33 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
101. Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. at 825, 885-86 (D.D.C. 1983).
102. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 416 (increasing capacity to supply all demand before a competitor could
enter the field); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), alfd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (providing machinery to customers only under long-term leases).
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discriminatory basis.' 03
As pointed out above, the government endeavored to establish, through
numerous case studies, that many of AT&T's actions were carried out
with a monopolizing purpose. The government also relied heavily on Con-
tinental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide,0" which suggested that an aggrega-
tion of actions, each in and of itself lawful, could taken together constitute
a "course of conduct" that violates the antitrust laws. The Justice Depart-
ment contended that the episodes demonstrated a monopolizing purpose,
while AT&T responded that they reflected little more than the sometimes
confused, but always well-intentioned, efforts of a regulated company to
adapt to rapidly changing commercial and regulatory circumstances. In
fact, many of the episodes admit to both interpretations. The interpreta-
tion of these episodes is so problematic that the government would proba-
bly not have succeeded in showing that AT&T's actions were carried out
with the purpose of monopolizing telecommunications. Indeed, Southern
Pacific, which involved much of the same evidence of allegedly anticompe-
titive conduct, supports this view.'0 5
1. Predatory Pricing
A major part of the government's case rested upon allegations that
AT&T engaged in exclusionary pricing in the intercity services market,
i.e., that AT&T raised rates in either local services markets or uncon-
tested intercity markets in order to lower rates and exclude competitors in
contested long-distance markets. This raises the question of what consti-
tutes-or should constitute-predatory pricing under the antitrust laws.
Competition-the object of the antitrust laws' 06-is said to be the pro-
cess by which producers share their surplus with consumers, an outcome
ordinarily accomplished by price cuts made in the face of competitive en-
try. Thus, price reductions by a monopolist are not always predatory,
much less socially undesirable. Too rigid or unbending a standard for
predatory pricing may discourage price cutting and, as a result, keep
prices above competitive levels. Too flexible a standard may allow preda-
tion to go undetected, thus substantially inhibiting competitive entry.
Areeda and Turner contend that both errors would be minimized under
a standard that defined as predatory those responsive prices that are below
the average variable costs of a given product or service. 107 Other antitrust
103. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 124 U.S. 383 (1912).
104. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
105. 556 F. Supp. at 1095-99.
106. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Northern Pac. R. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
107. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing & Related Practices Under Section Two of the Sherman
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scholars, such as Joskow and Klevorick, have argued for a somewhat
higher, average total cost standard, especially for firms that enjoy signifi-
cant market power.1 08 Note, however, that this latter standard is unwork-
able for assessing the pricing behavior of a multiservice, regulated firm
with substantial joint and common costs, since average total costs for any
one service cannot be identified.
Several difficulties confronted the Antitrust Division in applying these
traditional antitrust pricing doctrines in the AT&T case. The first was
that virtually none of the numerous FCC decisions dealing with the rates
AT&T proposed in the face of competition had determined that the com-
pany had in fact violated the Areeda-Turner standard or even the Jos-
kow-Klevorick standard, to the limited extent that the latter could be ap-
plied. While the FCC had found that profit margins varied among
services, the Commission itself did not conclude that prices on services
other than DDS failed to cover the short-run or long-run costs, variable
or marginal costs, or any other hypothetically correct costs. Second, what
evidence there was indicated that the regulators had often required prices
that were artificially high, not predatorily low. Faced with competitive
entry, AT&T submitted responsive rate cuts to the FCC and to state com-
missions only to have them successfully resisted by the competitive en-
trants in prolonged hearings. For example, throughout the 1960's and
1970's, the AT&T "Telpak" bulk discount rates gave rise to numerous
complaints by SCC's, in both regulatory and appellate proceedings, that
AT&T's rates were noncompensatory.109 The FCC took steps to ensure
the elimination of this bulk offering, even though the Antitrust Division
itself, in an appeal of the FCC ruling, claimed that the rates were not
predatory-that, in fact, "what evidence . . . [the FCC] did have showed
that the rates were not only compensatory [i.e. high enough to cover all
costs], but excessively so.
''1 °
In its antitrust suit against AT&T, the Antitrust Division did not con-
cern itself with establishing that Bell's pricing practices met any predation
standard. As the government's chief trial attorney told the court, "Your
Honor, we don't know whether they were pricing above any particular
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
108. Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J.
213 (1979).
109. See, e.g., TELPAK, 37 F.C.C. 1111, 38 F.C.C. 370 (1964), afl'd sub nom. American
Trucking Ass'n v. FCC, 377 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967); AT&T,
Private Line Servs., 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976). See also Aeronautical Radio, Inc v. FCC, 642 F.2d
1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1981); MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d
322 (D.C. Cir. 1980); AT&T Co. v. FCC, 602 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
110. Brief for the United States at 28, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d at 1221.
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standard of cost. . . .""' Instead, the Government alleged that AT&T
had priced its intercity services without regard to cost, and that this "stra-
tegic pricing" constituted the functional equivalent of predatory pricing.1
2
The gravamen of this argument is that wherever competition broke out,
AT&T responded with price cuts, while increasing rates elsewhere under
regulatory guidance.
Surely the application of orthodox standards would have been difficult.
When the prices charged are for regulated services that are produced us-
ing joint and common plant, applying these standards may be close to
impossible. As Judge Greene himself noted, there was no legal basis for
DOJ's novel theory that pricing by a regulated utility without regard to
costs constitutes an antitrust violation."' 3 Indeed, pricing without regard to
cost is a most peculiar standard to apply in an industry that is required by
regulation to deviate from cost-based pricing. It is not surprising that
Southern Pacific rejected this theory."
4
In any event, AT&T had a potentially powerful defense to the govern-
ment's predation arguments: that any monopoly power had been inno-
cently, or at least accidentally, acquired in the course of complying with
and furthering the purposes of regulation. To foster universal service, reg-
ulatory authorities had imposed rate constraints that made revenues from
local service substantially lower than the access and operating costs of pro-
viding that service. Thus, even if Bell used its control over local service to
maintain monopoly power in long-distance service, Bell did so using rates
set, with the repeated blessings of regulators, at levels necessary to subsi-
dize local service.
2. Denial of Access
The episodes that depicted Bell as denying or forestalling interconnec-
tion of independent long-distance systems to local networks further illus-
trate the importance of this regulatory rationale. Under FCC policies
adopted in the late 1960's and early 1970's, independent carriers paid
substantially lower access charges to local exchange facilities than did the
Bell System's Long Lines. The SCC's were not required to contribute to
joint and common costs via the separations process."' Long-distance com-
petitors threatened to drive prices down to levels that would make it im-
possible for Bell to meet the separations requirements necessary to subsi-
111. Transcript at 13,113, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131.
112. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1364 (D.D.C. 1981).
113. Id. at 1370. Nevertheless, by denying a motion to dismiss following the close of the govern-
ment's presentation, Judge Greene. refused to reject the theory. Id. at 1369.
114. Southern Pac.Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. at 914.
115. See ENFIA, 71 F.C.C.2d at 440.
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dize local service. In response, however, Bell could not unilaterally
deaverage its long-distance rates, setting lower rates for only high volume
long-distance services. Nor could AT&T unilaterally abandon the regula-
tion-created rate structures and move toward cost-based rates for all its
services. Such responses would have been contrary to the universal service
and common carrier goals of the FCC and state regulators, as well as to
the desire of state agencies to avoid local rate increases.
AT&T's failure to comply immediately with interconnection requests
from the SCC's should be evaluated in this context of conflicting regula-
tory goals. The company was caught in the middle of a tug-of-war be-
tween the need for competitive pricing responses and regulatory require-
ments for continued rate averaging and cross-subsidization. It did not have
the option, as DOJ alleged, of responding to new entry by cutting rates
for some services and then raising rates for others, because overall rate
levels were closely controlled and specific rates had to conform to regula-
tory requirements. AT&T's response to the pricing dilemma was to delay
compliance with interconnection requests until the regulatory agencies
gave measured and detailed guidance on the scope of the SCC's intercon-
nection privileges.'" This strategy, moreover, was consistent with the
FCC's concerns over the creamskimming. In Southern Pacific, Judge
Richey observed: "Had the FCC not engaged in its usual regulatory lag
and dealt forthrightly and properly with the problems as they arose, then
few, if any of the cases would now be before the antitrust Courts, such as
this one.111 7 Moreover, regulators should have postponed or at least
slowed the specialized carriers' interconnection requests until Congress
had had an opportunity to resolve the conflict between the goal of compe-
tition and regulatory goals of high quality and universal service.
The Justice Department, however, alleged that AT&T had manipu-
lated the regulatory process and thus caused the FCC delays, 'and that
AT&T's actions therefore fell under the "sham exception" to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. 8 Under that doctrine, any firm may seek regulatory
116. The delays encountered by specialized carriers seeking Bell interconnection were in fact no
different from those experienced by entrants into new services. For example, the introduction of cable
television service was accompanied by long delays while the Commission queried whether the compet-
itive services of cable companies would prevent conventional broadcasters from providing a full range
of programming, especially the unprofitable public affairs portion. The FCC eventually allowed com-
petitive entry in cable, citing recent court decisions and rapid technological developments in satellite
transmission as justification. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 988
(1977). See generally Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Television Competition Hangs, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 800 (1974).
117. 556 F. Supp. at 1097.
118. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers v. 'Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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action even if unfavorable to competing firms. The "sham exception" is
applied when misrepresentation or unethical conduct results in a subver-
sion of the regulatory process. 19 All but one of DOJ's contentions that
Bell's conduct fell within the sham exception were thrown out by Judge
Greene at the prior motion-to-dismiss proceeding. 2 Under the standard
of proof enunciated by Greene, this meant that the Department's own
evidence, unrebutted, preponderated against itself on these claims. This
makes sense, in particular because of the FCC's lack of clarity regarding
interconnection requirements following its Specialized Common Carriers
decision.
The charges regarding monopolization in the equipment market are
easily dispensed with. First, Judge Greene dismised the claims of preda-
tory pricing in equipment markets.1 2' The other claim-that it was a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act for AT&T to supply its equipment needs from
its own sources-is without legal basis. Finally, in the decree itself, Judge
Greene expressed his doubts as to the strength of the equipment market
charges: "[W]here the government was able to show that AT&T's market
share was high, it was generally unable to demonstrate significant an-
ticompetitive behavior; where evidence of behavior was more damning, it
had difficulty establishing market power."' 22 Hence, the equipment
charges were likely to have gotten nowhere.
Did AT&T monopolize long-distance service markets? Its reaction to
intercity competition was constrained by FCC and state regulation, so that
it could not even mount a normal competitive response to new entry. Bell
was not permitted to introduce its own new services, or to deaverage its
rate structure to bring its prices into line with the costs of its existing
services. The Bell tariff changes that were ultimately allowed did not ad-
just Bell System rates to fully competitive levels. The resulting rates were
not predatory, but were in fact higher than competitive levels and thus
protected rather than threatened new entrants.' Since AT&T's policies
permitted it to continue subsidizing local service, moreover, AT&T's be-
havior was intentionally proregulatory, rather than illegally
anticompetitive.
119. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
120. United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1364. The only exception was the Datron/
DDS episode. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. In Southern Pacific, all such claims were
dismissed. 556 F. Supp. at 881.
121. 524 F. Supp. at 1380.
122. 552 F. Supp. at 174.
123. See, Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d at 1245 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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C. Likelihood of Divestiture
The Department of Justice would probably not have convinced the
court to break up AT&T, even in the unlikely event that it had prevailed
on liability. Although a court, once monopolization has been established,
must fashion a remedy that will bring monopoly power to an end,1"4 di-
vestiture or dissolution is appropriate only where necessary to the health
of competition in the industry. As was said in Alcoa, "[d]issolution is not a
penalty, but a remedy. If the industry will not need it for its protection it
will be a disservice to break up an aggregation which has for so long
demonstrated its efficiency."12 5
Even though Judge Greene, in approving the settlement, thought that
injunctive relief was insufficient as a remedy,"' massive divestiture im-
posed after a full trial and determination of liability would probably not
have been sustainable on appeal. It is noteworthy that an FCC adminis-
trative law judge in the 1976 Phase H proceeding, addressing the alleg-
edly anticompetitive Bell System structure, concluded that divestiture
would be "most unwise and may even be catastrophic. 11 7 While the FCC
declined in that instance to render a judgment on the merits of divesti-
ture, 28 having been confronted with much the same evidence that was
before Judge Greene the Commission opted for injunctive, not structural,
remedies. If marketplace developments sufficed in 1976 to ameliorate the
allegedly anticompetitive Bell structure, it is difficult to see how in the
early 1980's, by which time competition in telecommunications had inten-
sified, the court could have determined that the dismemberment of Bell
was essential.
AT&T's strongest argument against divestiture would have been that,
as discussed above, 2 9 its shares of the equipment and long-distance service
markets were declining. This is a strong indication that even if AT&T
had been a monopolist at one time, it had since lost the power to exclude
competitors and was thus no longer a monopolist. In Alcoa, for example
declining market shares of the monopolizing firms were a major factor in
determining that divestiture was unnecessary. s8
AT&T could also have argued, persuasively, that the continuing pres-
ence of FCC regulation and the availability of private enforcement pro-
ceedings by actual or potential competitors were sufficient to protect com-
124. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968).
125. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 446.
126. 552 F.Supp. at 167-68.
127. AT&T & Associated Bell System Cos., 64 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1977).
128. Id. at 11.
129. Supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
130. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F.Supp. 333, 349-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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petition in the industry. It is thus reasonable to conclude that AT&T
would have avoided substantial restructuring, even if it had lost the liabil-
ity part of the proceeding.
IV. Economic Effects of the Settlement
A. Effect on Competition
The dissolution of the Bell System under the Baxter-Brown settlement
is supposed to lead to increased competition in the long-distance and
equipment markets. In theory, it separates competitive long-distance en-
terprises from local exchange activities, where scale economies require a
single company. The first are to be placed in the new stripped-down and
unregulated AT&T and the second in the regulated local operating com-
panies. This structural redesign is flawed in major ways. First, economies
of scale are not limited to local services, but are present in both long-
distance and equipment supply. In fact, the divestiture will specifically
convey some natural monopoly advantages to AT&T. Second, the compe-
tition currently in existence has survived only because of the regulatory
"umbrella" that kept AT&T rates up. When the umbrella folds and the
SCC's are made to pay full access charges, the competition will also fold.
At present, there is limited competition in intercity services. The Com-
petitive Impact Statement filed by the Justice Department on February
10, 1982, however, goes too far in conceding that "all segments of the
[intercity services] market now are characterized by some degree of com-
petitive activity," and that "many of the specific disputes that arose in the
early 1970's regarding local access for private line services were eventually
resolved through [private] litigation and negotiated compromise." ' This
is an artificial condition because the competition arose as a result of regu-
latory practices in the 1970's and cannot be sustained in the absence of
regulation.
Competition in an open, unregulated market cannot continue if there
are significant economies of scale. Research on Bell system costs has found
such scale economies across a broad range of long-distance operations,
particularly over the major trunk routes."'2 In Southern Pacific, Judge
131. Competitive Impact Statement in Connection With Proposed Modification of Final Judg-
ment (filed Feb. 17, 1982), United States v. AT&T Co., No. 82-0192 (filed Nov. 20, 1974) (reprinted
at 47 Fed. Reg. 7170 (1982)).
132. There have been both engineering and econometric studies of economies of scale in the tele-
communications industry. One engineering study found pronounced economies of scale in long-dis-
tance transmission and switching, but less substantial economies for local distribution and none for the
provision of local service. Systems Applications, Inc., The Domestic Telecommunications Industry:
Economic Behavior, Competition, and Public Policy (June 1974) (prepared for the Office of Telecom-
munications Policy). A second study considered six segments of the Bell System and found significant
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Richey concluded that "substantial" economies of scale were present, par-
ticularly in "networking".1"' In the present decree, Judge Greene specifi-
cally allowed AT&T a system-wide scale economy-joint billing of the
new AT&T's long-distance services with the divested companies' local
services-and estimated that the cost advantage conferred may be as great
as five dollars per customer per month.'
The magnitude of AT&T's scale economies after divestiture depends to
some degree on the manner in which the local/long-distance split within
Bell is accomplished. However the routes are divided, though, the new
AT&T will own a network of profitable long-distance routes and will
therefore enjoy the economies of scale that characterize long-distance oper-
ations. The intermediate distance operations exhibiting scale economies
are scheduled to be transferred to the surviving AT&T, leaving the local
exchange and transport areas (LATA's) to the operating companies."3
But numerous intermediate routes not exhibiting such economies may be
transferred into oversized LATA's, and become "intra-LATA" routes that
AT&T and its competitors cannot enter. This would compel independent
carriers to compete with AT&T only along the major trunk routes, where
AT&T's economies of scale and scope are greatest.' 3 6
economies of scale in each-routing, multiplexing, trunking, switching access, and especially long-
distance transmission. R. Skoog, The Design and Cost Characteristics of Telecommunications Net-
works (1980) (published by Bell Labs). Each of four recent econometric studies estimates that Bell
System costs decline as the scale of production increases, i.e., that the elasticity of costs coefficient is
less than one. L. Mantell, An Econometric Study of Returns to Scale in the Bell System (1974)
(unpublished staff research paper for the Office of Telecommunications Policy); H. Vinod, Applica-
tion of New Ridge Regression Methods to a Study of Bell System Scale Economies and Estimation of
Joint Production Functions (1976); H. Vinod & B. Raj, Bell System Scale Economies from a Ran-
domly Varying Parameter Model (1978); L. Christensen, D. Christensen, & P. Schoech, Single-Prod-
uct Cost Function Analysis of the Bell System 1947-1977 (Aug. 1979) (unpublished working paper,
Laurits R. Christensen Associates); L. Christensen, D. Christensen, & P. Schoech, Econometric Esti-
mation of Scale Economics in Telecommunications (Aug. 1980) (Social Sys. Res. Inst., Univ. of Wis.-
Madison Working Paper No. 8013); L. Christensen, D. Christensen & P. Schoech, Multi-Product
Cost Function Analysis of the Bell System, 1947-1967 (Dec. 1979) (unpublished working paper,
Laurits R. Christensen Associates); Nadiri & Schankerman, The Structure of Production, Technolog-
ical Change, and the Rate of Growth of Total Factor Productivity in the US. Bell System, in PRO-
DUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 219-47 (Cowing & Stevenson eds. 1981). All
of these studies are also discussed in Testimony of James N. Rosse, Defendants' Exhibit D-T-119,
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Sup. at 131.
133. 556 F. Supp. at 868-70.
134. 552 F. Supp. at 198-99.
135. See supra text accompanying note 75.
136. As GTE has noted in its comments to the court opposing the AT&T LATA plan:
The inclusion of many [metropolitan areas] and scattered noncontiguous parts in the massive
LATAs permits the operating companies to carry as exchange traffic intercity telephone traffic
between distant cities within the LATA boundaries. . . . [This] could result in creating the
potential for continued dominance by the operating companies and AT&T. This in turn,
through the creation of new bottlenecks, could possibly destroy viability of the independents
and their practical accessibility to competitive interexchange carriers.
Comments of GTE Corporation on Application for Approval of Exchange Areas or Local Access &
Transport Areas (LATA's) Established Pursuant to the Modification of Final Judgment at 14-15
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Not only will this restrict the competitive opportunities available to
AT&T's toll competitors, but it will also increase their costs. The settle-
ment contemplates the eventual assessment of a uniform LATA access
charge payable by all interstate carriers to replace the separations pay-
ments now covering joint and common costs. 3 ' That access charge, pre-
sumably, will be based on the revenue requirement of all basic exchange
facilities contained within a given LATA. The inclusion of low-density
rural facilities within the LATA will have the practical effect of requiring
all inter-LATA carriers, through their access charge payments, to bear
some of the costs of maintaining these more expensive facilities. This
shifts much of the burden of subsidizing non-compensatory basic exchange
services from AT&T to the local companies and, ultimately, to AT&T's
competitors as well." 8'
The advantages for AT&T due to scale economies and to spreading
cross-subsidy obligations is not mitigated by market segmentation, i.e., by
smaller firms entering only highly specialized or differentiated service
markets. MCI, Southern Pacific, and Datran all argued for economies in
Specialized Common Carriers, proposing competition only in specialized
markets." 9 Instead, their subsequent interconnection requests were for
regular long-distance service, in response to AT&T's high, cross-subsi-
dizing long-distance rates.' It is now probably too late for the SCC's to
find a secure niche in specialized services other than bulk message and
data transmission-which they have been cream-skimming for the past
five years-because of different equipment and skills requirements.
The specialized carriers still claim that they possess their own cost effi-
ciencies, that even their conventional services cost significantly less than
comparable Long Lines offerings because of newer plant and superior
productivity. Although the independent carriers' newer facilities and more
efficient personnel might account for some of their present rate discounts,
(filed Nov. 3, 1982), United States v. AT&T Co., No. 82-0192 (filed Nov. 20, 1974).
137. 552 F. Supp. at 196-97, 196 n.271, 227, 232-34, 169 n.161.
138. There may also be substantial economies of scale in research and development. Here again,
AT&T has a clear headstart on its competitors, since it retains Bell Laboratories. Bell Labs has made
virtually every major technological breakthrough in the communications industry since World War II,
see Testimony of William D. Nordhaus at 73-83, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131,
but, under the 1956 Western Electric consent decree, was required to license its patents to Bell com-
petitors. United States v. Western Elec. Co., at 71,139-41. The decree removes this requirement. 552
F. Supp. at 176-77. To the extent that future technological advances developed by Bell Labs decrease
costs, AT&T will have an even greater advantage over its competitors.
139. Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 872-76 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Wash-
ington Util & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
See Testimony of James N. Rosse at 53-75, United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131.
140. Economies of specialization seem particularly unlikely for independent resale and value-added
carriers which typically lease bulk capacity from AT&T and then resell it in segments, since the
lower prices they charge are strictly a result of AT&T's present tariff structure.
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most of their rate advantage stems from the fact that they do not pay as
much for local exchange access as does AT&T Long Lines. Under the
decree, the regulators are to decide whether to decrease Long Lines' access
costs or to increase the SCC's share of separations to the present AT&T
level. Either way, the proposed LATA access charge system requires that
intercity carriers pay equal fees for equivalent access, so that the principal
cost advantage of the independent carriers will disappear.
At present, the local access charges paid by the specialized carriers are
determined by a complicated formula set forth in AT&T's ENFIA
tariff. 41 Variables in the formula that would raise ENFIA charges to
levels comparable with AT&T's separations payments have been artifi-
cially depressed to prevent rate increases that might put the specialized
carriers out of business. The present ENFIA charge is only forty-five per-
cent of comparable separations charges.' 4 2 After LATA charges are put
into effect, specialized carrier prices, while now generally lower than
Bell's (see Table Six) would probably not differ by more than an amount
reflecting the lower quality of SCC services.' 48 The resulting disappear-
ance of the price advantage enjoyed by the specialized carriers from not
paying equivalent access charges will pit their claimed higher productiv-
ity, as limited as that may be, against Bell's scale economies.' 44
The decree will not strengthen competition in various equipment mar-
kets. The trial court noted that the customer-premises equipment (CPE)
field is already substantially competitive, 4 5 and that the government's
equipment monopolization claims were either baseless or weak." To fa-
cilitate new entrants, moreover, the FCC, in its Second Computer In-
quiry 47 decision, has already required that virtually all new CPA instal-
lations be deregulated effective January 1, 1983. Judge Greene declined to
141. Exchange Network Facils. for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 71 F.C.C.2d 440 (1979).
142. Exchange Network Facils. for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 51 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 677,
678 n.2 (1982); see TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Oct. 4, 1982 at 1-5.
143. See Bypassing Ma Bell, CONSUMERS REPORTS, Mar. 1981, at 164.
144. Of course, the regulatory authorities might attempt to save the SCC's by refusing to equalize
access charges as contemplated by the decree. See supra note 137. However, their ability to preserve
an access charge differential is still limited, to some degree, by the absolute level of access charges.
(The lower the access charges, the smaller the differential between them can be.) As discussed infra
text accompanying notes 149-51, the existence of bypass or "leapfrogging" technology will probably
prevent access charges from rising substantially, and may even force them down. This will make it
more difficult for the regulatory authorities to preserve a sufficient differential between the access
charges for AT&T and for the SCC's.
145. 552 F. Supp. at 191.
146. Id. at 163 n.137, 174. See also United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1380-81
(D.D.C. 1981) (dismissing monopolistic pricing claims in equipment markets).
147. Second Computer Inquiry, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 61 F.C.C.2d 103
(1976); Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977); Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384
on reconsid., 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), afrd sub nom. Computer & Communi-
cations Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, No. 80-1471 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1982).
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impose further requirements. The settlement, therefore, cannot signifi-
cantly add to competition in the customer premises segment of the equip-
ment market.
With regard to switching and central office equipment-the "big ticket"
items of the phone equipment business-Western Electric enjoys a mo-
nopoly that is likely to continue with or without the decree, the trial
court's statements to the contrary notwithstanding. The Department of
Justice endeavored to explain Bell's dominance in the switching equip-
ment market by contending that it had unlawfully compelled its operating
companies to buy solely from Western Electric. The trial court, as already
mentioned, found this portion of the case untenable. Yet Western's share
in this equipment submarket has not only been dominant, but has re-
mained stable throughout the last two decades. The court's prediction of
increased competition in switching equipment is therefore unjustified,
since it assumes what seems clearly not to be the case: that Western's
market dominance in switching equiment is due to anticompetitive prac-
tices. In reality, the decree merely requires that AT&T exchange its local




AT&T AND SPECIALIZED CARRIERS
(NEW YORK TO MINNEAPOLIS FOUR MINUTE CALL)
Monthly Percentage
Start-up Service Difference
Service Fee Charge Price from Bell
Bell Direct Dial none none $2.40 -
Out-WATS (1-line) $174.80 $31.65 $1.53 36% less
MCI Execunet none $10.00 $1.92 20% less
SPCC-GTE Sprint none $10.00 $1.92 20% less
ITT Longer Distance $30.00 $10.00 $1.89 21% less
WU MetroFone none $8.00 $1.80 25% less
U.S. Tel/All America none none $1.75 27% less
ALLNET (Combined Network) $25.00 $10.00 $1.72 28% less
SOURCE: DUN'S BUSINESS MONTH, Nov. 1982, at 61.
Although under the decree, Western Electric and the local operating
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companies will no longer be under common legal ownership and control,
the commercial and economic relationship between them with respect to
the purchase of central office equipment will remain unchanged. The de-
cree does not require the operating companies to alter their current
purchasing arrangements. Western Electric will surely remain the princi-
pal supplier of components used to upgrade the current base of switches
and should continue to be the principal supplier of new equipment as
well.
Thus, there are no realistic prospects for accelerated competition, as
contemplated by Judge Greene's decree, in either the long-distance ser-
vices or equipment fields. The decree adds potentially independent sources
of demand (the new regional companies) to telephone equipment markets,
but there is no basis to suppose that more sources of supply will material-
ize. In intercity services, where there now are competitors, price and ser-
vice competition probably cannot be sustained absent the current regula-
tory umbrella. An outbreak of vigorous price competition with reduced
FCC regulation should establish that the new AT&T, as the dominant
long-distance carrier, can price below the average total costs of the SCC's
and still reap substantial profits. The end result should be that AT&T
puts its competitors out of business, or settles for monopoly prices that are
high enough to sustain fringe competitors.
B. Effect on Local Telephone Rates
The decree's impact on local exchange customer charges is most likely
to be the opposite of the price reductions that might typically be expected
from an antitrust action. In fact, the decree will cause some combination
of increased rates and decreased service quality, especially for home
subscribers.
The goal of prevailing regulatory policies has been to keep local rates
below costs to ensure maximum residential and business participation in
the local exchange system. State and federal regulators have subsidized
local service out of long-distance revenues on the theory that local custom-
ers should be allowed to "share" in the productivity gains of AT&T's
long-distance enterprise. Moreover, there appears to be an economic justi-
fication for subsidization of local rates: The addition of each new local
subscriber benefits existing users by expanding the reach of their tele-
phones; thus (long-distance) subscribers should subsidize others to stay on
the system. 4
148. See Artle & Averous, The Telephone System as a Public Good: Static and Dynamic Aspects,
4 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 89 (1973); Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a
Communications Service, 5 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 16 (1974). These articles indicate that the
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In order to cover costs now subsidized by Long Lines, the local operat-
ing companies must either raise local service rates to consumers or in-
crease access charges to the various long-distance companies. There are
two problems that make it unlikely that the regulators will take the latter
route to higher revenues. First, since the decree requires that access
charges to AT&T and the SCC's be equalized-and since AT&T now pays
higher access charges, substantial increases in access charges would jeop-
ardize the viability of the SCC's by increasing their costs proportionately
more than AT&T's. Such a result would contravene the FCC's present
policy of encouraging competition in long-distance markets. Second, the
ability of the regulators to raise access charges is limited by the ability of
long-distance companies to "leap-frog" over the local exchanges in serving
their valued business customers.149 The higher the access charges, the
more attractive such bypassing becomes, so that, at some point, an in-
crease in access charges will actually decrease the revenues derived there-
from. 150 The decree specifically allows AT&T to bypass local facilities in
this manner."'
Given only limited increases in long-distance access charges, local rates
will have to rise significantly in order for the local companies to sur-
vive.1 52 Recent regulatory changes in accounting requirements, deprecia-
tion adjustments, and inflation will also cause significant increases. The
Commerce Department projects that these conditions alone will cause lo-
positive externalities are insufficient to justify the magnitude of the present subsidies.
149. A microwave tower positioned on the borders of a local exchange calling area, for example,
can easily transmit to a downtown office building much of its specialized business traffic. Such tech-
nology is readily available and its cost is rapidly decreasing. Indeed, the Merrill Lynch "Teleport"
facility, which will soon service the entire New York City financial district, is little more than an
effort to "leapfrog" the facilities of New York Telephone Company. The trial court apparently as-
sumed that state regulatory authorities must approve construction of the facilities needed for such
bypassing. While this may be true for intrastate toll offering, it is not true for facilities used to provide
interstate services, which are subject solely to FCC approval. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Reg'y Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); California Interstate
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 328 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
150. The fact, discussed infra text accompanying note 156, that business demand for long-distance
service is highly concentrated means that even a relatively small increase in access charges might
trigger significant bypassing.
151. 552 F. Supp. at 175-76.
152. An examination of prices established by regulatory commissions during the 1970's reveals
rates of return insufficient to cover Bell's costs of capital. In fact, AT&T's return was consistently
below the return for a composite of Standard & Poor's 400 industrials. Even the return on other high-
grade utilities exceeded that of AT&T for each year of the period, although their stocks are considered
no more risky that AT&T stock. Testimony of Virginia A. Dwyer, United States v. AT&T Co., 552
F.Supp. at 131. Another estimate of AT&T's rate of return employs James Tobin's q ratio as an
indicator of monopoly rents. The q ratio (the market value of the firm divided by the replacement cost
of its assets) is expected to approximate one for a competitive firm, and to be significantly higher for a
firm making monopoly profits. In their study of the average q ratios of 257 firms for the period 1960-
77, Lindenberg and Ross found AT&T's average q ratio to be 1.09, certainly below that expected of a
firm receiving monopoly returns. (Average q ratios for all firms ranged from .45 to 8.53.) Lindenberg
& Ross, Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 J. OF BUS. 1, 2-3, 18 (1981).
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cal rates to increase over the next five years from their present average of
$9.16 to about $16.16 a month.153 In fact, Florida regulators recently pre-
dicted monthly local rates of $25 to $30 by 1986.'
Of course, there could be mitigating circumstances, such as advances in
technology, that may aid local companies in achieving new operating effi-
ciencies. Since the settlement modifies existing separations payments,
which have until now given local phone companies an incentive to over-
invest in local plant, there may also be some cost-saving changes in local
company investment patterns. But capital and operating costs of local
companies will not vanish in the near term.
Thus, there are no available alternatives to significantly higher local
telephone rates if service quality is to be sustained. Because local rates are
subject to regulation, necessary rate increases may come only after exten-
sive delay. Service quality, however, is not subject to comparable direct
control by state regulators, nor is investment in new equipment to meet
future calling demands. Faced with a profit margin squeeze resulting from
regulatory delay and reluctance to pass on to consumers the subsidy bur-
dens previously borne by AT&T Long Lines, local companies are likely
to cut back investment and thus degrade the quality of telephone service.
Low-budget customers, as a result, will see a return to delays in both
repair service and the placement of calls. Even more likely, investment
cutbacks will lead to delayed introduction of technological improvements.
All of these changes would run counter to the FCC's mandate to provide
universal, high-quality service.155
The trial court notes that the intercity carriers initially will have an
interest in maintaining the integrity of local exchange operations, since
poor local service would adversely affect their long-distance revenues. Lo-
cal exchange companies, however, might simply provide higher quality
service only to long-distance callers. Major long-distance business consum-
ers, for example, could be given priority service, while residential custom-
ers could be required to wait during periods of excess demand. Long-
distance revenues are quite concentrated-in the case of business users, for
example, four percent of the customers account for nearly sixty-two per-
153. Impact of Federal Communications Commission Decisions on Local Telephone Service:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Gov't Information and Individual Rights of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1982) (testimony of Ass't Sec'y of Commerce, Bernard J.
Wunder, Jr.). This estimate, however, does not take into account possible changes in the cost of
capital once the present Bell System financial "umbrella" folds. Capital costs of local operating com-
panies will increase once they become primarily single-product companies functioning in a cyclically
sensitive and low-profit part of the telephone business. The estimate also assumes that revenues from
access charges and separations and settlements will remain constant.
154. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1983, at DI.
155. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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cent of long-distance billing"'5 -so it is technically feasible for the tele-
phone companies to give preferential treatment to particular customers.
Thus, contrary to the FCC mandate, there could be increasing disparities
in the quality of telephone service, with business subscribers benefiting
while home subscribers in high cost areas experience reduced service
quality.
V. The Continuing Tension Between Antitrust and Regulatory Policy
In addition to its effects on competition and prices in telecommunica-
tions specifically, the decree has important implications for antitrust and
regulatory policy generally. In particular, the decree leaves unresolved a
number of important issues concerning the proper role of antitrust law in
regulated industries.
First, the settlement precluded a determination of whether a fully regu-
lated industry can possess monopoly power. AT&T argued that pervasive
entry and rate regulation by the FCC and state agencies made any market
share definition of monopoly power meaningless. It is in fact the raison
d'etre of such regulatory bodies to contain monopoly power.157 Antitrust
liability under Section Two of the Sherman Act requires a finding of mo-
nopoly power, yet such a finding here would have implied that the FCC
and state regulators had been remiss in their duties. Can the inadequacy
of regulation be the basis for imposing antitrust liability on a regulated
firm?
Second, the decree leaves undefined the appropriate standard by which
to evaluate regulated prices set in response to competitive entry. The
court, in approving the settlement, offered no guidance as to whether
DOJ's novel concept of pricing without regard to cost can be used as a
predatory pricing standard. Neither the government's contention that rate
disorientation is inherently predatory, nor AT&T's defense that such rate
disorientation was required by regulation, was addressed. This means that
a regulated company that modifies its prices in an otherwise non-preda-
tory response to competition may be more vulnerable to antitrust attack
than an unregulated company. that engages in similar pricing behavior.
An unregulated company has as a defense that it set prices greater than
some measure of cost, while a regulated company, according to DOJ's
theory, would not. This makes no sense from an antitrust policy view-
point. To the extent that rate disorientation is caused by regulation,
DOJ's theory would elevate antitrust law over the valid concerns of regu-
156. HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 7, at 88, 89.
157. See, e.g., Policies & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. &
Facils., 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 457, 459 (1981).
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lation. The alternative is to follow Southern Pacific and explicitly reject
the standard of pricing without regard to cost."6 8
Third, in approving the settlement, Judge Greene did not address the
conflict between the hostility of antitrust to restrictions on entry and the
need for regulatory control of entry to prevent creamskimming. The Com-
munications Act of 1934 imposes on common carriers an obligation to in-
terconnect with other carriers, but only upon an FCC finding that such
access is "in the public interest."'" The antitrust laws, however, impose
an open-ended obligation on those in control of essential facilities to allow
full access to competitors.' ° Was AT&T required to provide interconnec-
tion to competitors under the antitrust standard, even though it was not
explicitly required to do so by the FCC or state agencies-and even
though interconnection would have undermined its regulation-based rate
structure? Was AT&T so required, even though the FCC and, indeed, an
earlier Antitrust Division, had supported AT&T's refusal to provide
access?16'
A final unresolved antitrust question is the appropriateness of the di-
vestiture remedy. The settlement seems to suggest that massive structural
relief would have resulted if the case had been adjudicated, but that sug-
gestion also ignores the presence of regulation. Simple injunctions com-
bined with private enforcement, particularly in the presence of watchdog
regulatory bodies, would seem a more than sufficient remedy. Yet Judge
Greene indicated that the FCC was not up to the task. 62 Is one judge's
condemnation of a regulatory board's effectiveness sufficient to require
divestiture?
Although the AT&T settlement generates many questions about the
application of the antitrust laws, it leaves unanswered a more important
question that strikes at the very existence of regulation, given that most of
the allegations against AT&T involved actions that were the inevitable
consequence of regulation. Should these actions, which serve the goals of
regulation, be prevented by the antitrust laws and the courts?
Restrictions on entry, controls over price, and suppression of competi-
tion are found in most regulatory schemes. They are the regulatory tools
158. 556 F. Supp. at 946.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
160. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); American Trucking Ass'n v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 406, reh. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 402-03 (1912).
161. Execunet I, 561 F.2d at 365; Execunet II, 580 F.2d at 590. The Department of Justice, as
statutory respondent pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1976), was a party to both actions, and sup-
ported both the FCC's and AT&T's contentions that the service for which MCI sought interconnec-
tion was unauthorized.
162. 552 F. Supp. at 168.
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with which goals favoring certain groups of consumers are implemented.
Separating prices from specific costs allows for cross-subsidization, but
only if coupled with entry restrictions to prevent creamskimming. Hence,
anticompetitive behavior is required under regulation and is in direct con-
flict with the antitrust laws. By conferring his blessing on a private agree-
ment, Judge Greene implicitly resolved this conflict between regulation
and antitrust in favor of the latter without bringing the issue to appellate
review. At the same time AT&T embraced the settlement, exasperated by
the unwillingness of Congress to establish groundrules for the transition
from closed monopoly to open competition.
Absent direct legislative action, Congress has entrusted the FCC with
the determination of what in telecommunications is the "public interest."
The settlement in essence removes this public interest determination from
the FCC's control. Should the settlement in effect emasculate the FCC in
its own field? 6' A partial answer is that the AT&T settlement and decree
seem likely to achieve neither sound antitrust nor traditional regulatory
policy objectives. The AT&T suit presented an ideal opportunity for judi-
cial resolution of conflicting goals, because its central issue was whether
Bell's "anticompetitive" response to entry could be justified as furthering
the goals of regulatory policy. But instead, the decree creates only the
impression that antitrust laws have overturned the entire field of
regulation.
The antitrust objective of fostering competition is not likely to be mea-
surably furthered. What competition existed in long-distance before the
settlement was artificially supported by the regulatory practices that kept
up Bell's long-distance rates. Now, as access costs are equalized, AT&T's
full competitive power will be unleashed, and there is no reason to believe
that the level or intensity of its competition in long-distance services will
increase. The opposite seems more likely, and Bell may be transformed
from a regulated monopoly into an unregulated one, which belies the ra-
tionale for allowing competition in the first place.
The objectives of regulatory policy will not be furthered by the decree.
Telephone rates will be deaveraged, unbundled, and, for local services,
163. At least Judge Richey in Southern Pacific thought not:
[Tihe antitrust laws were never intended to destroy an essential public utility. . . [Slound and
honest regulation of telecommunications at the federal and state level is our only guarantee of
access to this necessity throughout the whole country and not just part of it. [emphasis in
original]
556 F. Supp. at 1097. The resolution of this tension between antitrust and regulation may lie in using
the implied immunity doctrine to expand the range of regulatory decisions that should be out of the
reach of the antitrust laws. As Judge Richey showed, immunity can be expanded indirectly by taking
into account regulatory goals in determining whether regulated conduct violates the Sherman Act.
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increased by as much as eighty percent. 6' This should end the expansion
of and reduce the quality of local service. Regulatory standards for com-
mon carriers will no longer prevail, as unregulated competition will drive
resources away from universal low-cost service and toward packaging
low-cost bulk service for a small fraction of the business community.
Who then stands to gain from the AT&T settlement? Clearly AT&T
has won by losing, by having been left with the cream of its old services
but with the restrictions on its ability to compete in those services re-
moved. Bell has simultaneously freed itself from both the antitrust laws
and regulatory control. As for the public, we seem to have lost by
winning.
164. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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